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Abstract- -This  paper considers Cournot ohgopohes with product differentiation when the firms 
have inexact knowledge of the price funcUons and there are random time lags in obtaining and imple- 
menting information on the firms' own outputs and prmes as well as on the prmes of the competitors 
After the basra dynamic model without time lag is formulated, the asymptotic stability in the hn- 
ear case is examined The introduction of time lags makes the asymptotic behavlour of the steady 
state more complex A detailed stabihty analysis IS undertaken In the case of symmetric firms and 
with a special weighting function, the possibility of the birth of hmlt cycle motion m output is also 
investigated m addition to stabihty analysis. @ 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The research on static and dynamic oligopolies is one of the richest areas in the economics 
literature. Since the pioneering work of Cournot [1] many scientists have examined oligopoly 
models and their extensions. Okuguchi [2] has provided a comprehensive summary of results on 
single-product models, and their multi-product extensions with applications are discussed in [3]. 
In most of the models discussed in hterature, it is assumed that the firms have full knowledge of 
all price functions as well as having instantaneous reformation available on the firms' own outputs 
and prices and on those of the competitors. 
There have been some attempts at modeling the lack of precise knowledge m oligopolies. Cyert 
and De Groot [4,5] have discussed mainly the duopoly case, Kirman [6] considered ifferentiated 
products and linear demand functions, which firms misspeclfy and attempt o estimate. He also 
showed that the dynamic process may converge to the full information equilibrium or to some 
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other equilibrium. An economically guided learning process has been introduced by Gates et 
al [7], and Kirman [8] has analysed how the equilibrium values are affected by mistaken beliefs. 
L~onard and Nishimura [9] have shown how the fundamental dynamic properties of the model 
can be drastically altered in discrete duopolies. Their model has been investigated in the case of 
continuous oligopolies by Chiarella and Szidarovszky [10]. 
It is well known (see, for example, [11]) that for linear systems, local and global asymptotic 
stability are eqmvalent, however, in the presence of nonlinearity, this is no longer true. For 
discrete time scales, global asymptotic stability of the equilibrium of the Cournot model as well 
as the emergence of periodic and chaotic behavior around it is examined by Kopel [12-14]. The 
structural stability of continuous oligopolies without information lags has been investigated by 
Krawiec and Szydlowski [15] by showing that the structure of the phase space is independent of
the dimensions of the model and the dynamics of oligopoly models are structurally stable. Similar 
studies have been performed by Puu [16,17]. Russell et al. [18] have introduced fixed-time lags and 
examined the resulting dynamic process. Difference-differential equations with infinite spectra 
had to be studied. This approach, however, has two major drawbacks. First, the length of many 
time delays is uncertain, so it cannot be assumed to be a fixed number. Second, the presence of the 
infinite spectra makes the application of stability and bifurcation analysis analytically intractable. 
These drawbacks can be overcome by using continuously distributed time lags. This has the effect 
of distributing the time lags over a range of values. It also turns out that the spectrum of the 
resulting dynamic system is finite. Continuously distributed time lags were originally introduced 
by Cushing [19] in mathematical biology. Their first economic application was given by Invernizzi 
and Medio [20] and later they were successfully applied to dynamic oligopolies by Chiarella [21], 
Chiarella and Khomin [22], and Chiarella and Szidarovszky [23]. 
In this paper, the method introduced in [23] will be extended to oligopolies with product 
differentiation, and this methodology will be applied to cases when the firms have only imperfect 
knowledge of the price functions. The paper develops as follows. After the basic dynamic model 
is presented, the information lag will be then formulated and included into the model. In the 
case of symmetric firms and special weighting functions, stability analysis will be presented then, 
as well as the possibility of the birth of limit cycles will be discussed. 
2. THE OL IGOPOLY MODEL WITH 
PRODUCT D IFFERENTIAT ION 
Consider an n-firm oligopoly with single differentiated products. Let f, and C, denote the 
price and cost functions of Firm i, respectively, then its profit is given as 
7r, = x , f ,  (Xl,' • • , xn) - C, (x,), (1) 
where X l , . .  ,xn denote the outputs of the firms. In this paper, we assume that at each time 
period each firm observes its own output and all prices, however, they do not know the price 
functions exactly. Let f*3 denote the price function of Product 3 as believed by Firm i. In 
formulating the reply functions of the firms, we have to develop a mechanism to assess the 
outputs of the rivals. Let p~,... ,p,~ be the observed prices and x* the output of Firm i. Then, 
this firm thinks that the outputs of the rivals satisfy equations, 
f , j  (Z1 , . . . ,  X,--1, X~*, X ,+ I , . . . ,  Xn) = p;, (2) 
for 7 ---- 1,2,. - ,n. So, there are n equations for n - 1 unknowns. Because the firm has an 
inexact knowledge of the price functions, these equations are usually contradictory and the firm 
may obtain no solution. Therefore, Firm ~ selects the x l , . . . , x , - l ,X ,+ l , . . . xn  values as its 
assessments of the outputs of the rivals which minimize the squared average rror, 
1 [/. (xl ,  - p;]2. (3) 
3=1 
Product  Differentiat ion 415 
Let h~(x*,p~,. . . ,p*)  denote the minimal solution which is assumed now to be unique. 
With fixed x_~ = (xl . . . .  , x~-l, x~+l,..  • x~) let 
g, (x_ J  = arg ma~ {x,S,, (x , ,x,)  - C, (x,)} (4) 
denote the best response, which is unique if x~f~ - C~ is strictly concave in x~. Therefore, the 
best response of Firm ~ turns out to be 
g, (h, (x, ,pl ,  .. ,pn) )= (g, oh~)(x , ,A (x l , . . . , xn) , . . . ,A (x l , . . . , xn) ) .  (5) 
If each firm adjusts its output into the direction of its best reply, then the dynamism is modeled 
by the system of nonlinear ordinary differential equations, 
:~z = ]Q ((gz O h~) (x , ,  f l  (X l : '  • • , Xn) , " "  , f~ (zx , " "  , zn))  - x~), (6)  
for i ---- 1 ,2 , . . . ,  n, where k~ is a sign-preserving function. 
EXAMPLE 1. Consider the linear case, when the true price function of Product 3 is 
/3 (~1,... ,~)  = b, kxk +a, ,  (7) 
k=l  
but Firm i believes that this function is 
n 
f,~ (xl,'" , xn) = E b,~kXk +a,j, (8) 
for all i and 3. Assume that the cost function of Firm z is given by 
c ,  (z,) = ~, + ,~,x,, (9) 
for all i. The believed profit of Firm z is given as 
x~(k~#b~kxk+b~x~+a,~ ) --(/3~+a~x~). (10) 
We assume b,,, < 0, that is, the firms believe that their own price is a decreasing function of 
their own output, is a reasonable assumption in most economies. Under this assumption, there 
is a unique profit maximizing x, which is assumed to be positive. Then, it can be obtained from 
the first-order condition that 
2b,,,x, + Eb,,kxk +a, ,  -- a,  = 0, (11) 
implying that the best response is determined as 
1 a ,  - -  a~, 1 ~ a ,  - a~, (12)  
g, (z-s) - 2b,,, ~b~,~ + 2b,,~ - 2~,, b-'~--" + 
where _b[ -- (b**l, • , b ..... 1, b**,,+l,..., b .... ). 
Equation (2) has now the special form, 
E b,,kxk = p; -- b,,,x~ - a,,, (13) 
k#, 
for j = 1 ,2 , . . . ,n .  
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For the sake of mathematical simplicity introduce the notation, 
p* = : , b, = , _a, = " 
and 
b, l l  . .  " b,l,,-1 b,l,,+l - "  b , !~)  
\b,,~x" b . . . . .  1 b~, ,+ l ' "  b~ 
then the best least-squares fit of equation (13) is determined as 
_h, (14) 
Therefore, in equation (6), 
oz~--a,~ b~, b: ( ) - I  T . . oQ-a,~ 2b,,---fl- e B_:B_, B_, [B,~_, +(b_:-b_~)xr +a*-~, ]  + 2b,,----Y 
(15) 
where we have used the simphfying notation, 
_B~ = 
b~l.., b~,~_ 1 b~,~+l " - • 
b* l " "  bn,~_ 1 bn,z+l"'" 
b~n 
b~,~ 
b:= • , 
\b i~/  
Consequently, the dynamics (6) of the system becomes 
and a* = 
~ T --1 
\ 
a ,  - a~ _ z '  ~ (16) 
where we assume that the adjustment function is linear: k,(A) = K~ • A with K~ > 0. The 
asymptotic behavior of the resulting linear system can be examined by using standard method- 
ology. 
Consider further the special case when all firms know the exact price functions. Then, b, = _b*, 
_ = *, b* .. * b* . . .  b~*~) and a~ = a* for all ~. Then, equation (16) B~ B~ b, r = ( ~1, • ,b ... .  1, ,,z+l . . . .  
simplifies as 
where 
1 
2b~ 
is a constant for ~ = 1, 2 , . . . ,  n. 
Notice that the coefficient matrix of system (17) has the special form, 
(18)  
K.D.H ,  (19)  
where 
K=diag(K1 ,  - ,Kn)  , 
(1  1) 
m D = diag 2b~1' ' 2b"*n 
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and 
[ 2b;1 b~2 ... bS,~ b~l 2b~2 b~,~ lH ~  , . . • J 
\ b~l b~2 2b*, ] 
Since b~ < 0 and K, > 0 for all ~, both matrices K and D__ are positive definite. It is well 
known (see, for example, [11]) that system (17) is asymptotically stable if H +/ /3 -  is negative 
definite. This is the case, for example, if the matrix is strictly diagonally dominant. Hence, we 
have the following result. 
THEOREM 1. Assume that for all ~, 
]b,, + b,, I < 4 Ib, I. (20) 
3:¢* 
Then, system (17) is asymptotically stable. 
Condition (20) can be interpreted as stating that the quantity of Product s has a much higher 
effect on its own price than do the outputs of the other products. 
3. THE EFFECT OF  INFORMATION LAGS 
In this section, we reexamine model (6) under the assumption that in the right-hand sides 
only delayed values of x~, . . ,xn  are used. Such lags arise when the market reacts to delayed 
quantities in price formation, or the firms react to an average of old data in order to avoid an 
over-reaction to sudden changes in market conditions. By assuming continuously distributed time 
lags, in equation (6), x3(t ) is replaced by a weighted average of earlier data, that is, 
e / t  
x,, (t) = w (t - s, T,, ,  m, , )x ,  (s) ds, (21) 
where w is the appropriate weighting function, taken as a special gamma or exponential density 
function, 
1 r r t+1 
W(t s ,T ,m)  = (22) 
T e-(t-s)/T, m = if 0. 
Here, T > 0 and m is a nonnegative integer. Notice that this weighting function has the 
following propertms, 
(a) for m = 0, weights are exponentially dechning with the most weight given to the most 
current data; 
(b) for m >_ 1, zero weight is assigned to the most current data, rising to maximum at t - s  = T, 
and declining exponentially thereafter; 
(c) as m increases, the function becomes more peaked at t - s = T. As m becomes large, the 
weighting function may for all practical purposes be regarded as very close to the Dirac 
delta function centered at t - s = T; 
(d) as T -~ 0, the function converges to the Dirac delta function; 
(e) the area under the weighting function in interval [0, oc) is unity for all T and m. 
The same weighting function was used in earlier studies on the classical Cournot model with 
information lags in [22,23]. 
The asymptotic behavior of the resulting nonlinear Volterra type integro-differential equation 
is examined via linearzation, since the system can be rewritten as a larger system of nonlinear 
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ordinary differential equations (see [23]). The linearized system has the form, 
)J: 
]=1 
+E 5~,7,k w(t--s,T,k,m,k)xk~(s) d  , 
k#~ .7=1 
(23) 
where x** denotes the deviation of x, from its equilibrium level, K,  = k~(0), and 
- Ox~ ' 5'3 - Of 3 ' % ~  = Ox~' 
at the steady state. In order to derive the characteristic equation, we seek the solution in the 
form, 
:~  (t) = v~ ~' (i = 1, 2 , . . . ,  ~). (24) 
Substituting this form into equation (23) and allowing t -~ co, we have 
[ (n 1 )~-K~ A~ + E5~373~ - 1 w(s,T~,rn~)e-X~ds 
2=1 
--k~¢~ K~ j=l (~33'3k w(s,T,k,m,k)e-Z'~ds vk=O.  
V~ 
(25) 
By introducing the notation, 
A~(~)=~-K~ A ,+ 5,37a~-1 AT,, +1 
2 =1 \ r** 
(26) 
with 
{ m**, if m**_> 1, r** = 1, if m,~ = 0, 
and 
fi 
) -(.~,~+i) 
B~k =-K~ 5~373k ( -~T~k + 1 
3=1 \ r*k 
with 
m,k, i fm,k_>l ,  
r,k = 1, if m,k = 0, 
equation (25) can be rewritten as a nonlinear eigenvalue problem, 
(27) 
A1 (,k) B12 (,~) BI~ (,k) l
B21(A) d2()~) " '  B2n(;~) =0.  (28) det . . : : 
\ Bn~ (~) 8n~ (~) An (~) 
In the general case, it is impossible to give a closed form simple representation of this equation, 
so m order to investigate the location of the eigenvalues, it will be necessary to resort to numerical 
methods. 
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EXAMPLE 2. Consider again the linear case examined in the previous example. 
tion (15), we see that 
/k,-- 2b~,zbr (B~B,)-IBTb, 
and 
5z 3 -- ~b~z,b: (/~T~_~,)-IB__zTa, 
where e 3 is the 3 th basis vector, and from equation (7), we have 
From equa- 
(29) 
(30) 
3'3, = bj~. (31) 
4. SPECIAL  CASES 
We assume first that for each firm, functions B~ 3 (£) are identical for all values of 3. So, let 
Bv(A ) --- B~(£). This is the case when from the viewpoint of all firms, the competitors are equal 
and considered identical. Then, the eigenvalue quation (28) becomes 
det 
A1 (,~) B1 (.~) '" B1 ()0 '~ 
A2( ) ... 
/ 
B~(A) Bn(~) . . .  A~' (£ ) ]  
= 0. (32) 
It  has been shown in [23] that this equation can be rewritten as 
(A~ (A) - B~ (A)) 1 + A~ (£)'--B~ (A) = 0, z=l ~=1 
therefore, the elgenvalue quation breaks up to (n + 1) equations, namely, 
(33) 
At (A) - B~ (A) = 0 (i = 1 ,2 , . . . ,n ) ,  (34) 
n 
1+ z B (a) ~=1 A~ (~-2~ (~) = 0. (35) 
The general treatment of these equations can be performed in the same way as shown m [23], 
so the methodology is not repeated here. Instead, further special cases will be analyzed. 
?2 Consider next the symmetric ase, when K1 . . . .  Kn -- K with K > 0, A~ + ~3=1 5~33'3~ -- 1 
n - A, and ~-'~.3= 1 5z3~'jk -- 5, T~ - T*, m~ - m*, T~k = T, rn~k = m, for all z and k 7~ z. Then, 
r~ =- r*,r~k - r, and for all z, 
and 
AI(A)-=A-K/k (AT* \ r* +1)-(m*+1) 
(a )  = -KS  - -  + 1 
therefore, equations (34) and (35) are reduced to the two simple polynomial equations, 
/~ (..~r*)rn* +1 (_~_r_)rn+l ( .~r ) rn+l  (AT*)m*+l  
\ r* +1 +1 -KA  - -+1 +KS +1 =0 
\ r* 
(36) 
(37) 
(38) 
and 
)~(/~r'\ r* )m*+l(~ )m+l (_~T_)m+l (AT* I'm*+1 
+ 1 - -  + 1 -KA  + 1 - (n -  1) K5 + 1] = 0. (39) 
\ r* 
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For the sake of simplicity, assume that the time lag in obtaining and implementing information 
on its own data is much shorter than that on the data of the other firms. So, we might assume 
that T* = 0. Then, equations (38) and (39) can be summarized as 
whereN=lor l -n .  
First, assume that 5 = 0. 
(A - KA)  + 1 + KSN = O, (40) 
if 
1 -KTA >0,  5 -A>0,  5 (1 -n) -A  >0,  
which occurs if and only if {1 } 
A<min  ~--~; 6; 5 (1 -n)  . 
A2T+A(1-KTA +K(SN-A)=O.  (41) 
It is well known (see, for example, [11]) that all eigenvalues have negative real parts if and only 
(42) 
(43) 
Under condition (43) the steady state is locally asymptotically stable. When the steady state 
loses asymptotic stability, then certain kinds of instability may occur. We are particularly inter- 
ested in explonng the possibility of the birth of limit cycles, which result in fluctuating output 
patterns. 
THEOREM 2. Assume m=O and the symmetr ic  ase with A > O, furthermore that one of  the 
values 6 - A and (1 - n)5 - A is positive and the other is negative. Then, there is a l imit cycle 
in the neighborhood of the critical value Tcr = 1/ (KA) .  
PROOF. In order to use the Hopf bifurcation theorem (see [24]), we are looking for pure complex 
roots. I f  A = ia is a nonzero root of equation (41), then 
-~2T + ~a (1 - KTA)  + K (fiN - A) = 0. (44) 
Equating the real and imaginary parts to zero, we have 
a2 _ K (6N - A) and 1 - KTA = 0. (45) 
T 
Real a exists if 6N - A > 0 and T = 1/ (KA) .  T > 0 requires that A > 0. We select T as the 
bifurcation parameter, so the critical value of T for both values of N is 
1 
Tcr -  KA"  (46) 
Differentiating equation (41) implicitly with respect o T, we have 
0A -A  2 + AKA 
o--f = 2~T + (1 - KT~)  (47) 
At the critical value with A = za, 
O~T a 2 + ,aKA KA a (48) 
- 2~aTcr = 2T¢~ *2TCr' 
T - -  
with nonzero real part. Then, the Hopf bifurcation theorem implies the existence of limit cycle. | 
Then, equation (40) has only real roots: A = KA and for T # 0, 
A = - r /T .  So, if A < 0, then the steady state is locally asymptotically stable and if A > 0, then 
it is unstable. If A = 0, then no definite conclusion can be drawn. So, in the ensuing discussions, 
we will always assume that 3 ~ 0. 
If m = 0, this equation is quadratic, 
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Note that  the condition that only one of the values 6 - A and (1 - n)6 - A is positive implies 
that there is only one pair of pure complex eigenvalues. 
Assume next that m = 1, then equation (40) is cubic, 
faT 2 + 12 (2T - KAT  2) + • (I - 2TKA)  + K (hN - A) : 0. (49) 
The local asymptotical  stabi l i ty of the steady state can be analysed by applying the Routh- 
Hurwitz criteria (see for example, [11]), the details of which are ieft to the reader as a simple 
exercise. 
THEOREM 3. Let m : 1 wlth the symmetr ic ase. 
(i) Assume first that 5 > O. I f  0 < A < 5, then there is a positive critmal value for T 
with N = 1, which is the smaller root of equation (53) and there is Bruit cycle in its 
neighborhood. I f  A = 0, then wlth N = 1 there is a critical value for T given by 
equation (63), and there is a l imit cycle around it. / f0  > A > - (1 /8 )5 ,  then both roots of 
equation (53) are critical values for N = 1, and there is a l imit cycle in the neighborhood 
of both of them. 
(ii) Assume next that 6 < O. IfO < A < 5(1 -- n), then there is a positlve critical value for T 
with N = 1 - n, which is the smaller root of equation (53), and there is a Bruit cycle in 
i ts neighborhood. I f  A = O, then with N = 1 - n there is a critmaI value for T given by 
equation (63), and there ~s a l imit cycle around it. I f  0 > A > (1/8)5(n - 1), then both 
roots of  equation (53) are critical values for N : 1 - n, and there is a l imit cycle in the 
neighborhood of both of them 
PROOF. To analyze the possibihty of the birth of l imit cycles assume again that  X = ~a is a pure 
complex root. Then, 
-~a3T  2 - a 2 (2T - KAT 2) + m (I - 2TKA)  + K (hN - A) = 0. (50) 
By equating the real and imaginary parts to zero, we obtain the condition, 
a2 _ 1 - 2TKA _ K (6N - A) (51) 
T 2 2T - KAT  2" 
In order  to have  real nonzero  a, we  need  
1 - 2TKA > 0. (52) 
The critical value of T is obtained from the second equation in (51) as the solution of the 
quadratic equation, 
2T2K2A 2 - TK (4A + 6N) + 2 = 0. (53) 
Positive solution for T exists if and only if 
4A+hN > 0 
and 
K 2 (4A + 5N) 2 - 16K2A 2 = K25N (hN + 8A) >_ 0 
and in this ease both roots are positive. First, notice that equation (53) can be written as 
2 (TKA - 1) 2 = TKhN,  
(54) 
(55) 
A > - 15N (57) 
implying that  6N >_ O. If 6N = 0, then TKA = 1, whmh contradicts condition (52). Hence, we 
must have 5N > 0. Inequalities (54) and (55) can be now summarized as 
(56) 
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Notice that if 5 ¢ 0, then with N = 1 and 1 - n, we get different critical values, and if 5 = 0, 
then equation (49) is identical for N = 1 and 1 - n, so the critical values coincide in the two 
cases. 
Differentiating equation (49) implicitly with respect o T, which is selected again as the bifur- 
cation parameter, we have 
0)` _2)`3T _ )2 (2 - 2KAT)  + 2AKA 
OT 3)`2T 2 + 2)` (2T - KAT 2) + (1 - 2TKA)  
2a 2 (1 - KAT)  + 2z (a3T + aKA)  (58) 
( -3a2T  2 + 1 - 2TKA)  + 2~c~T (2 - KAT) '  
with real part at the critmal value, 
Re- -  = T 2 (KTA - 1) (KTA - 5)" 
T=Tcr,.(N) 
Under condition (52), the denominator is always positive, and the numerator is nonzero if 
KTA ¢ -1 .  From equation (53), it is easy to see that KTA = -1  if and only if A = - (1 /8 )5N.  
We will now elaborate in more details the conditions for positive critical T values. We have to 
consider three cases depending on the sign of A. 
First, assume that A > 0, then from equation (53) and condition (52), we should have 
TK = (4A + 5N) ± .v/SN (SN + 8A) 1 
4A2 < (60) 
which is equivalent o the condition, 
2A + 5N < Tv /SN (SN + 8A). (61) 
Since both 5N and A are pomtive, the left-hand side is also positive, so (61) may hold with 
only the positive sign. In this case, (61) is equivalent o relation, 
< 5N, (62) 
in which case (57) is obviously satisfied, and (61) holds with the smaller root only. 
If A < 0, then from equation (53) and condition (52), we should have 
TK = (4A + 5N) ± v/SN(SN + 8A) 1 
4A2 > ~-~, 
which holds for both positive roots. 
If A = 0, then equation (49) becomes 
A3T 2 + )`22T + )` + KSN = 0 (63) 
and (51) is specialized as 
So, the critmal value of T equals 
a2= 1 _ KSN (64) 
T 2 2T 
2 (65) 
Tcr (N) - 5NK '  
which is always pomtive, if 5N > O. 
I fS>0,  thenSN>0foron lyN=l ,  and l f5<0,  thenSN>0foron lyN=l -n"  I f5=0,  
then 5N cannot be positive. | 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, n-firm Cournot oligopolies with product differentiation were examined under 
uncertainty, when each firm is able to measure its own output and all prices. Since firms use 
only believed price functions, the outputs of the rival firms are obtained by using a special least 
squares fit of the price equations. These estimates of the rivals’ outputs are then used by each 
firm to determine the best response of the rival firms. It is also assumed that each firm adjusts 
its output into the direction of its best response, so a system of nonlinear ordinary differential 
equations is obtained to describe the output trajectories. In the linear case, sufficient conditions 
are given for the asymptotic stability of the steady state. 
Then, it was assumed that there is an information lag in obtaining and implementing output 
information, or that the firms are reluctant to react to sudden changes so they react to aver- 
aged market fluctuations. This situation is modeled with continuously distributed time lags, and 
the resultant nonlinear Volterra-type integro-differential equations were examined by lineariza- 
tion and eigenvalues analysis. In the case of symmetric firms, analytical results were obtained. 
Conditions were derived for the local asymptotic stability of the equilibrium, and in the case of 
bifurcation, the possibility of cyclical behavior was explored. 
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